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Environmentalists and opponents of oil refineries drew on popular images of the
Maine coast as a tranquil and pastoral place untouched by the modern era. Images
such as this early-twentieth-century photograph of Broad Cove, Eastport, stood in
sharp contrast with plans for supertanker ports.
Maine Historical Photograph Collection, Fogler Library Special Collections.
Courtesy Special Collections Fogler Library; University of Maine.

SCRIPTING MAINE’S
ENVIRONMENTALIST MAJORITY:
THE “THEATER OF OIL,” 1968-1975
B y C h r is t o p h e r S. B ea ch

Christopher Beach argues that Maine's contemporary environmental
movement was created in the late 1960s when oil companies seeking
sites for new refineries and tanker ports saw the Maine coast as ide
ally situated for expansion: close to southern New England and the
mid-Atlantic coast, but relatively undeveloped and in need o f eco
nomic re-energizing or so they thought. Hearings and conflict among
fishers, state and local officials and politicians, residents (seasonal
and permanent) and environmentalists created a long-term debate
that in turn spawned a new understanding o f Maine as a pastoral
landscape for the modern world. Christopher Beach received his J.D.
from the University o f M ainet School o f Law and his Ph.D. in Canadian-American History from the University o f Maine. He is an assis
tant professor o f History/Humanities at Unity College in Unity,
Maine.

he playwrights and cast of the “Theater of Oil” were an unlikely
coalition of summer people, natives, newcomers, retirees, activists
new and old, journalists, lawyers, a governor, promoters, and citi
zens. Together they engaged in an extended public political performance
that helped Mainers o f all kinds redefine the state and reconstruct their
understandings o f region and home place. Their performance projected
a new set o f images o f Maine to the national scene and, in the process,
helped to create Maine’s “environmentalist majority.” Postindustrial
Maine was created during an intense and dramatic period: the “Theater
o f Oil” opened in 1968 and closed around 1975.
According to a 1971 Forbes magazine article, it was now “nearly im 
possible to build an electric power plant, a jet airport, an open-pit mine,
or a resort complex without strong protest from keep-out forces.” Taken
aback by this onslaught against the politics of growth, an Oregon Pacific
Power and Light official articulated the rationale for industrial expan
sion in guarded tones: “I know t hat . . . developm ent. . . conjures up the
idea o f smokestacks, lunch buckets, etc. and this is in conflict with the
uncluttered, tranquil landscape that all of us would like to have. But I
M aine History 40:1 (Spring 2001)
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think you will all concede . . . that [in the future] we will have lots of
people here. We must plan for them, and they have to have jobs.” The
Forbes editor mused nostalgically: “Remember when the high school
band— not pickets— met those visiting industrial delegations?” In addi
tion to posing a serious challenge to growth, local campaigns brought
together a diverse collection o f civic, scientific, and conservation groups,
forging a new environmentalist ethic that spread quickly to other areas
and concerns as the decade passed.1
For Maine, the point o f departure for popularizing the environmen
tal movement was the coast. In 1968, Maine became embroiled in a se
ries of oil refinery and tanker port proposals that threatened to despoil a
landscape o f fishing villages and seascapes synonymous with the state’s
individualism and traditional way o f life. Bluntly put, the issue was not
the possibility of “spill[ing] a little oil,” but rather preserving a pastoral
icon. “A water view . . . is a refreshment to the heart. . . We do not want
to stare at oil tanks, nor have them stare back.” Opposition first arose
among urban preservationists and summer home owners, but this nar
row political base expanded quickly, as virtually every group with an in
terest in the future o f the coast joined in the debate.2
Defending Maine’s rock-bound coast popularized environmental
goals and bridged class and regional differences. Here again, environ
mentalists invoked a successful litany: drawing attention to these power
ful symbols o f regional identity, they rallied popular sentiment to defend
the public trust against “outside” urban and industrial enemies. Pastoral
images, cast in ecological terms and disseminated by energetic grass
roots groups, conservation organizations, and environmental journal
ists, kindled a new, broad-based environmental imagination, affirming
the emergence o f Maine as a postindustrial “nature state.” Maine’s envi
ronmentalist majority, a central feature of its late-twentieth-century po
litical culture, emerged from this “Theater o f Oil.”3
A key example o f landscape preservation, the coastal campaign in
Maine demonstrates the blossoming o f the environmental imagination.
Threats from an easily identifiable “outside” enemy invoked a fierce de
fense of place, making the preservation battle incendiary, especially with
the politics o f growth also under siege. The controversy brought envi
ronmental organizing and environmental rhetoric to its height and
forced officials to respond to popular activism with planning proposals
that attempted to channel this new environmentalist energy in less con
frontational directions.
In 1968, all but two percent of Maine’s coastline was in private
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hands, and the most conspicuous owners were wealthy seasonal resi
dents. Thus critics of preservation could legitimately ask who gained
from locking up the coast like a “giant state park” Up to this point,
Maine politics had adhered more closely to traditional growth strategies.
The textile crisis had passed, but Maine's economic growth indicators
still ranked near the bottom nationwide. Jobs, cost of living, economic
growth, and taxes remained high priorities, and for these reasons, more
than half the people in the state would favor oil refineries on the coast.
Locally, however, Mainers rejected the specific proposals that violated
their sense of place: no particular location was found to be ideal for de
velopment. Moreover, as opponents pointed out, refineries offered only
limited job opportunities for local people; more often they attracted
skilled workers from outside the state, people who compromised
Maine's powerful attachment to local sovereignty. Still, resolving Maine’s
oil controversies was contingent on finding alternative jobs for coastal
residents.4
From the beginning, Maine's coastal controversy was shaped by outof-state interests. Promoters of independent oil firms were the first to
identify Maine's undeveloped deep water coastline as a site for new re
fineries. The idea was embraced enthusiastically by the New England
Council for Economic Development, a Boston-based regional chamber
of commerce. Opposition to the refinery proposals also came first from
outsiders. Maine’s summer residents raised the alarm, seconded by the
New England chapter of the Sierra Club, also based in Boston. This pat
tern—powerful out-of-state industrialists battling sophisticated out-ofstate preservationists—was typical of Maine's early environmental poli
tics. As the controversy unfolded, though, local interests entered the fray.
By the time the oil dispute subsided, the heady process of public debate,
media reports, legislative compromise, and executive management had
prepared Mainers to formulate and conduct future environmental con
troversies on their own .5
The struggle to protect the coast changed Maine's popular environ
mental politics in three ways. First, it galvanized an environmental es
tablishment. It provided opportunities to build advocacy organizations
and media readerships, and it opened up careers for environmental
journalists, planners, consultants, and politicians. During several years
of intense popular debate, these oil controversy professionals had time
to refine their positions, sharpen their public images, and define issues
in various public forums. Journalists refined the art of environmental
analysis; public leaders tuned their rhetoric to a new environmental con
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stituency; consulting economists built careers around their planning ex
pertise.
Second, the oil controversy had a substantial impact on public con
sciousness. Concern for the coast was channeled through a new legisla
tive process: agency-sponsored public hearings on specific development
issues. This grassroots stage for popular “witnessing” catapulted local
citizens into the decision-making and opinion-forming process. It cre
ated a new popular consciousness, so intensely focused that the gover
nor’s office eventually found it necessary to change both the format for
public input and the planning process itself.
Third, the controversy changed the ideological configurations of
Maine politics. Democratic leaders like Senator Edmund S. Muskie ar
gued the importance of jobs and judged this against the whims of what
he labeled “summer residents, visitors and suburban residents” looking
after their lifestyles. In turn, preservationists cast these public officials as
old-style conservationists out of touch with Maine’s new concerns.
Rhetorically, the split between “new conservationists” and “old conser
vationists” had become clear by 1970. In fact, no oil or petrochemical
complex was ever built on the Maine coast, and the controversy was
brought to a close not so much by popular outcry as by national and in
ternational energy developments. But the impact of the controversy was
crucial to the formation of a new popular environmental conscious
ness—Maine’s environmentalist majority.6
The dilemma of coastal development fell heaviest on Governor Ken
neth M. Curtis, who held office between 1967 and 1973. To environmen
talists, Curtis was an enigma: “No governor since the late Percival P. Bax
ter has spoken out more forcefully. . . on conservation matters,” they
acknowledged, yet like all postwar Maine leaders, Curtis was a strong ad
vocate of growth. Maine’s poor were still unable to find decent jobs, he
reminded his constituents, and the exodus of rural youth undermined
the state’s future. To stem this outflow, Curtis proposed intensive use of
natural resources and more incentives to draw industries and tourists to
Maine. Thus, despite his rhetorical support for environmentalism, Cur
tis remained aloof from the coastal preservation issue. “Summer people
failed to apply themselves to the solution of Maine’s hinterland trou
bles,” he said. Having made their money off of industrial growth else
where, they held back industrial development in Maine. “Their fall, win
ter and spring habitats have become unbearably foul and now they’re
worried about the summer nest.”7
Yet in an increasingly polarized political climate, coastal preservation
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Governor Kenneth M. Curtis was an advocate for economic growth and develop
ment in the state, but he came to cooperate with the em erging‘environmentalist
majority.” Photograph from The Curtis Years, 1967-1974, edited by Allen G. Pease
(Augusta, ME: Office of the Governor, 1974). Courtesy Special Collections Fogler Li
brary, University of Maine.

could not be dismissed easily. Environmentalists, having cast the paper
industry as the archvillain in earlier fights to save the state’s rivers, now
took aim at other corporations and grew even more insistent. But labor,
the core of Maine’s Democratic constituency, remained lukewarm about
this environmental agenda. Curtis tried to straddle a growing gulf in
Maine’s liberal constituency by insisting on statewide planning, begin
ning with a survey to identify Maine’s unique natural sites. Planning
would ensure these sites would not be “trampled to death in the state’s
rush for development profits.” To insulate development needs from the
antigrowth mood threatening Maine’s fragile economy, Curtis high
lighted the State Planning Office as a key administrative agency. With
the icons of the nature state encased in protective law, he believed,
Maine could move ahead to “broaden its economic base without de
tracting from its environmental integrity.” The oil controversy was an
extraordinary political debate because it operated at a cultural level, not
just a political level and it marked a major transition in Maine history,
helping Maine people emerge from a pessimistic sense of their own
marginality and helplessness. The controversy’s drama unfolded in four
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acts. Act 1 raised a new question—could Maine be something other than
expendable or quaint? Act 2 answered that question with a resounding
“yes.” The climactic act 3 confirmed that Mainers of all kinds agreed on
the new cultural definition of their state and act 4 helped institutionalize
the new environmental understanding. Maine's “Theater of Oil” firmly
established the state as a national leader in the emergent national politi
cal culture centered on the values of environmentalism .8

Act 1. Downeast Maine: Expendable or Quaint

The controversy began in June 1968, when Governor Curtis an
nounced a proposal to build a tanker port and refinery in the small town
of Machiasport, near the Canadian border. Later that year, additional
port and refinery proposals emerged for the state's heavily populated
Casco Bay, and in 1970 for Penobscot Bay, the state's most picturesque
coastal area. These projects were motivated by new oil tanker technol
ogy. East Coast ports could handle ships up to 60,000 deadweight tons,
but this was only one-fifth the size of the new supertankers. Maine's
deep water harbors offered an obvious alternative.9
Advocates for the oil proposals first cast their arguments in terms of
regional economic benefits. Among the earliest supporters of the Machiasport project was the New England Council, representing major busi
ness, labor, professional, public, financial, utility, and industrial interests.
The Council was organized in 1925 by the six New England governors to
deal with the textile crisis, and promoting oil was a logical extension of
this earlier regional concern. Here again a natural advantage—cheap ac
cess to deep water harbors, like cheap access to water power for textile
mills— could outweigh the lack of a critical resource—oil or cotton—
and create a new industry. Speaking for the Council in Portland in Octo
ber 1968, A. Thomas Easley argued that Maine, by accepting an oil refin
ery on its coast, would begin to contribute its fair share to New
England's overall economic development. An oil-poor, energy-intensive
region, New England needed the port for smaller independent dealers,
Easley argued, to break the monopoly of the major oil companies. Lay
ing aside a bleak picture of regional victimization, Easley painted a vi
brant future based on competitive energy prices and regional economic
growth, all resulting from the Machiasport proposal. Easley also dis
missed the environmental hazards of a supertanker oil port in regional
terms by noting that Machiasport's remoteness recommended the pro
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posaL The town, he argued, could “handle the super-tankers . . with a
minimum hazard to densely populated areas along the New England
seacoast.” Easley was clearly willing to sacrifice Maine's underpopulated
and politically weak eastern coast in order to benefit the rest of New
England. He closed by returning to the regional theme: “This project is
the only real hope for a deep water port and refinery on the East Coast
that will solve the high energy costs of our forgotten region.”10
Opposition to the Machiasport refinery was also cast in regional
terms. A pamphlet prepared and distributed widely by the New England
chapter of the Sierra Club articulated the pastoral themes that identified
the Maine coast as a regional icon. “Only north of Acadia National Park
do substantial stretches of the Maine coast remain free of tourist devel
opment and light industry.” There the landscape of small farms and fish
ing villages remained “as it must have been a hundred years ago.” A
Sierra Club member from Michigan who rented “Snuggle Home Cot
tage” near the proposed refinery site extolled the picturesque cottages,
the rough but scenic twisting roads, the wild, lonely beaches. After a
month exploring historical sites, walking the beach, and watching lob
ster buoys bobbing in the waves, she concluded that Machiasport was
“one of the finest unspoiled areas on the shrinking Maine coast.” This
summer reverie provided dramatic backdrop for enumerating the “all
too familiar . . . problems of overcrowding, air and water pollution” the
refinery would bring. Passage to the docking site was hazardous because
the bay was home to twenty-foot tides, storms, fog, and rocky shoals. A
large spill would threaten the Georges Bank, New England's finest off
shore fishing grounds, and Maine's tourist industry, worth $400 million
a year, was also at stake.11
Recognizing a need to provide alternatives to the economic stimulus
refinery promoters pledged, the Sierra Club suggested that low-impact
tourism, based on eastern Maine's isolation, its history, and its beauty,
would take up the slack. For readers bothered by the irony of promoting
isolation as a means to increase the number of tourists, the Sierra Club
offered another proposal: federal subsidies to offset lost income, if the
area accepted national zoning and preservation controls. Local towns
would be compensated “for surrendering their right to develop.” Those
individuals who chose not to stay and “work hard for relatively meager
incomes” could simply “move away.”12
With the oil issue framed in regional terms, Maine's public officials
entered the debate. Like the New England Council, Governor Curtis ap
proved the Machiasport site for political reasons: he thought that local
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resistance w ould be m in im al on the rem o te an d eco n o m ically depressed
eastern coast. N evertheless, it w ould have been n early im possible to lo 
cate an oil p o rt anyw here on the M aine coast th a t was n o t w ith in the
view o f at least a few influential su m m e r residents, an d C u rtis’s choice o f
S tarb o ard Island in o u te r M achias Bay d id ju st th a t.M
T he su m m e r resident h a p p e n e d to be G a rd n er M eans, a co n su ltin g
eco n o m ist from W ashington D.C. M eans was u n d o u b te d ly shocked at
th e a n n o u n c e m e n t th a t his s u m m e r view m ig h t n ow in clu d e s u p e r
tankers, pipelines, oil refinery stacks, an d tan k farm s, b u t he was too as
tu te to launch a d irect attack on the pro p o sal. As a n o n v o tin g o u tsid e r—
a “su m m e r c o m p la in t” in local p a rla n ce — his p ro test w ould lack the ring
o f au th en ticity . M eans in itiated M ain e ’s first local response to the oil
p ro p o sal by p osing a series o f seem ingly reaso n ab le an d balanced q u es
tio n s th a t did n o t p u r p o r t to c o m m it the q u e stio n er to a firm position
for o r against the proposal.
M eans posed his q u estio n s as an a p p o in te d m e m b e r o f G o v ern o r
C u rtis’s ow n C ouncil o f E co n o m ic A dvisors. In S ep tem b er 1968, the
co u n cil sent th e g o v ern o r a list o f t e n q u estio n s, d rafted p rin cip ally by
M eans. H ow m u ch , th e C ouncil asked, w ould be ad d ed to d ev elo p m en t
costs if th e p ro p o se d refinery was relocated in lan d , so as to m inim ize
“th e d e leterio u s effects u p o n a p a rtic u la rly b eau tifu l p o rtio n o f the
coastline?” W ere the o p p o rtu n itie s for an cillary in d u strie s— p e tro c h e m 
icals, sh ip b u ild in g , a c o n ta in e r p o rt— realistic? H ad the effects o f p o ssi
ble air an d w ater p o llu tio n on clam s, lobsters, fish, b lueberries, to u rism ,
a n d recreatio n been investigated adequately? T h e q u estio n s were n o t to
be taken as a negative view, b u t ra th e r as an o p p o rtu n ity for “th o ro u g h
c o n sid e ra tio n ” o f a w ider range o f issues. T he council avoided challeng
ing G o v e rn o r C u rtis o u trig h t, b u t its in v en to ry o f th re a te n e d land and
w ater resources im plied th a t he h ad acted precipitously. O verall, the
council advocated “m o re stu d y ”— a delay w hich gave the o p p o sitio n
tim e to o rg a n iz e .14
A n ticip atin g m ore overt controversy, C u rtis a p p o in te d an ad hoc
C o n se rv a tio n an d P la n n in g C o m m itte e on th e M a c h ia sp o rt Project,
d o m in a te d by his ow n su b o rd in ates an d local officials w ho favored the
refinery. T he c o m m ittee reiterated the regional th em e, suggesting th at
th e only real o p p o sitio n cam e from the m a jo r oil firm s. Local p a rtic i
p a n ts assured the g o v e rn o r’s representatives th a t th e ir n e ig h b o rs favored
th e p roject, as long as no p o llu tio n w ould result. H aving fulfilled its in 
te n t— to give an a p p ea ra n ce o f careful d e lib e ratio n a n d stu d y — the
c o m m itte e d isap p eared from the p u b lic d e b a te d -''
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Act 2. “A Somewhat Overripe Mackerel”
With the Machiasport proposal stalled in the federal permitting
process, a second supertanker port proposal, sponsored by King Re
sources Company, targeted the densely populated Casco Bay region near
Portland. Portland Harbor was already the second largest importer of
crude oil on the East Coast, servicing, among other things, a major
pipeline from Montreal. The additional facilities, to be located at an un
used Navy oil terminal on Long Island, would make Portland the world’s
largest oil importing port by volume. Mindful of these benefits, the
Portland City Council quickly rezoned the Long Island site to accommo
date King Resources. This action energized local opponents, who gath
ered over two thousand signatures and organized Maine’s first grass
roots anti-oil organization under the name Citizens Who Care
(CWC).16
Coming on the heels of the Machiasport controversy and a disas
trous oil spill in California’s Santa Barbara channel, the Portland oil ter
minal proposal generated an outpouring of public commentary. Aware

Large oil tankers, like this one belonging to the Pittston Company, were anathema
to those concerned with preserving both the ecological health and the pastoral
beauty of the Maine coast. From The Pittston Company, “Prospectus for a 250,000
BPD Refinery and Marine Terminal at Eastport, Maine,” April 19, 1973.
Courtesy Special Collections Foyler Library, University o f Maine.
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of the potential for controversy in the vote-rich Portland area, Curtis
confined his public statements to Machiasport, maintaining a neutral
stance on the Portland project. Despite his attempt to smooth the trou
bled waters, by 1969 coastal preservation had come to dominate political
discussions in Maine. In 1969 NRCM and Maine Audubon Society
(MAS), two groups emerging as Maine’s most active environmental or
ganizations, formed the Coastal Resources Action Committee (CRAC), a
full-time lobbying organization led by Republican lawyer-lobbyist Ho
race Hildreth and his Democratic counterpart, Harold Pachios.17
CRAC’s founding underscored the professionalization of the envi
ronmental movement. Operating in a world of powerful industrial and
labor interests, Hildreth and Pachios were both familiar with the process
of drafting legislation, negotiating compromises, and working within
the system of legislative politics. In the ensuing controversy, Maine’s en
vironmental organizations gained a remarkably professional veneer, yet
unlike the outside organizations that initiated the controversy, they re
mained tuned to local perspectives of people living and working on the
coast. Playing on these concerns, the NRCM quoted Robert Monks, a
Maine-based oil promoter with the demeanor of a Boston Brahmin who
had dismissed the threat to coastal fisheries offhandedly If local fisher
men could “run lobster boats, they can run [oil-spill] clean-up boats” as
well, he said. Highlighting Monks’s disdain for the local fishing commu
nity, the NRCM offered the folk wisdom of lobsterman Jasper Cates,
who talked in more meaningful terms about the impact of the refinery
on “our livelihoods, our environment, and our way of life.”18
Sensitive to a changing popular mood on the coast, the NRCM in
troduced a theme rarely articulated in Maine: local aversion to popula
tion growth. The predicted spin-off industries—petrochemicals, pulp
and paper, aluminum, metal products, perhaps shipbuilding—would
create more jobs than Maine’s “current population” could fill, the
NRCM warned, meaning a “rapid migration into the area . . . over
whelming both the natural environment and the way of life of the pres
ent inhabitants”19
The message gained currency along the coast. Oil promoters had ar
gued time and again that tanker ports and refineries would allow Maine
a “share in the nation’s riches.” Heavy industry meant a broader tax base
for sewage treatment plants, schools, low-cost housing, streets; it meant
better connections, more businesses, and above all, more jobs. And yet
along Maine’s eastern coast, insularity and sense of place bred fear of
such changes, especially when initiated by outside promoters. One
Downeaster worried that economic progress would bring “whorehouses
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and gambling casinos ... as they have in New York, New Jersey and other
places where oil refineries are located ” The intangibles of the develop
ment question—noise, traffic, waste problems, air and water pollution,
crime, big government, corporate domination, loss of traditions and
community control—worried local residents. Unlike Boston-based pro
moters and preservationists, NRCM and CRAC learned to articulate
their point of view in consonance with the subtle fears and concerns
drifting through coastal communities.20
Aware that they could not “sit back and relish the prospect of a re
gion preserved like some curiosity in amber,” the NRCM offered to co
operate with state development planners to develop more sophisticated
economic alternatives. “The imagination and energy [they] . , sum
moned in the cause of preservation” would be “put at the service of the
state in solving Washington County's very real economic problems ” The
NRCM suggested promoting small businesses on the model of rural
Scotland's electronics industry and Canadas aquaculture experiments.
Environmentalists would transform Maine's fixation on growth by ap
pending the key word “clean” to industrial development.21
With Maine people closely tuned to the controversy over two pend
ing oil proposals, the issue moved inexorably to the state legislature. In
1969 Republicans and Democrats reached a consensus that projected
their sensitivity to both the economic needs and the traditional values of
coastal life: oil could come to Maine (the prodevelopment stance) as
long as it did not harm the environment (the anti-oil stance). To achieve
this balancing act, the House of Representatives created an interim com
mittee to study ways of ensuring the safe transportation of oil along the
Maine coast. The committee was chaired by Harrison Richardson, a
Portland-area lawyer and liberal Republican with ambitions for higher
office.22
The House resolution establishing Richardson's committee drew at
tention to the vulnerability of the Maine coast. Oil spills could not be
eliminated, the committee recognized, and although they might be in
frequent, the effect could be catastrophic. By unanimous vote, the bipar
tisan committee recommended a measure considered by Newsweek mag
azine to be one of the “nation's strongest antipollution bills ever”: a spill
abatement program lodged in the Environmental Improvement Com
mission (EIC) and funded by a tax on oil imported at Maine coast ter
minals. According to Newsweek, “Outraged industrial lobbyists sputtered
in disbelief, especially now that Maine's deep-water ports . . . have put
the state on the verge of an oil bonanza.”23
On the House floor, the debate generated a profusion of bipartisan
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rhetoric proclaiming fidelity to the Maine coast. Intended largely as
campaign fodder—approval was already a foregone conclusion—the de
bate demonstrated the growing power of Maine’s pastoral images over
the legislative process. Richardson opened the debate by pointing out
the national significance of Maine’s coast. Economically Maine was
viewed as a “sort of . . . weak sister of the continental United States” he
conceded, but in this instance its underdevelopment offered an advan
tage: Maine could avoid the mistakes already made by its more industri
alized counterparts. Democrat John Jalbert confirmed the bipartisan
commitment to the pastoral ideal, recalling the days when industry was
“in complete control” of Maine’s natural landscape, and fumes from the
polluted rivers peeled paint from nearby buildings. “We have the most
beautiful coastline in America, and a tourist business and fishing and
lobstering business[es] that will disappear unless we are able to place
meaningful controls on a conveyancing of oil.” Maine, according to Jal
bert, could lead the nation with responsible legislation, and at the same
time “give our own citizens the protection they need and that they de
serve.” His speech was followed by several other tributes to the “rockbound coast of Maine, revered by people throughout the world,” and the
bill passed by a highly unusual vote of 134 to l.24
Legislation enacted by a vote of 134 to 1 contains a variety of un
stated compromises. For his part, Governor Curtis had gone from label
ing the NRCM a “bunch of conservative Republicans [who] . . . like
Maine just fine the way it is” to active cooperation with the newly profes
sionalized environmental establishment. In fact, by the time the bill
passed, all sides had reached agreement. Curtis published statements
supporting the legislation; oil and environmental lobbyists joined the
negotiations, and committee hearings on the bill generated “massive”
demonstrations of public support.25
While back room negotiations probably explain the nearly unani
mous vote on the Oil Conveyancing Act, this consensus was unusual,
given the emotional tenor of the process. The debate and vote reflect a
release of long-standing frustration with Maine’s status as New Eng
land’s poor country cousin. In the oil controversy Mainers of all kinds
were beginning to savor the new importance of their coast as a deep wa
ter resource and as a pastoral sanctuary. Big industry, urban New Eng
land, and the nation at large seemed to need Maine. The state’s nine
teenth-century motto, Dirigo (“I Lead”), assumed new significance as
the legislative special session garnered nationwide media attention. Rep
resentative Jalbert’s remark about the “eyes of the nation” on Maine ar
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ticulated an emotional sensitivity entirely new to the chronically de
pressed state. According to the New York Times, “the magnitude of sup
port for these imaginative conservation measures . . demonstrates not
only the good sense of the people of Maine, but the power of a good idea
whose time has finally come.”26
The Oil Conveyancing Act was accompanied by another bill that al
lowed the EIC to regulate site location for large industrial developments.
Endorsed by a two-to-one margin, the Site Location Bill attracted far
less attention than its companion legislation, but was destined to have
more impact on the evolution of environmental consciousness in
Maine. The law established two new procedures: a form of “spot zoning1'
for developments over twenty acres, to be administered by state, rather
than local, government and a procedure mandating public hearings on
controversial projects. In a mostly rural state unused to any form of
public land-use planning or zoning, but with a long tradition of con
tentious local town meetings, the law seemed tailored to raising grass
roots environmental awareness.27
The standards set by the act were an invitation to controversy: a
project would be approved if the developer had the financial and techni
cal capacity to ensure that it would fit “harmoniously into the existing
natural environment” and that it would not “adversely affect existing
uses, scenic character, natural resources or property values in the munic
ipality or in adjoining municipalities ” The political implications of the
new law were first tested in connection with the King Resources super
tanker port proposal for Portland’s Long Island. A source of public con
troversy for over two years, the project had already polarized public
opinion. EIC Chair Donaldson Koons predicted that the meetings
would be a learning experience for everyone; an expectation borne out
by subsequent events.28
On a hot, muggy afternoon in May, 1970, a crowd of citizens gath
ered in a Portland high school gymnasium for the first meeting under
the new Site Location Law. Problems with the public address system au
gured for a generally chaotic meeting: speakers shouted, the audience
called for louder voices, and tempers rose, all familiar experiences for
Mainers used to annual town meeting. Organized resistance was spear
headed by CWC, by now a veteran grassroots fighter, while a new Maine
Citizens Oceanology Alliance, claiming 300 members, added support.
King Resources got “only two tentative and timid claps,” while Koons
had to gavel for order several times to halt applause for the opponents. A
steady parade of homemakers, small business owners, summer resi
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dents, fishermen, and property owners kept the meeting lively through
the long afternoon and evening. Business reporter Frank Sleeper found
the seven hour hearing lengthy, disorganized, and emotional: a “weary
ing” session. Chairman Koons tried to confine debate to the narrow is
sue of how the King pier would affect the environment, but he was over
whelmed by the “mass of emotion” focused on the broader implications
of the tanker port. The hearings provide ample evidence of the extent to
which the oil controversy had, by 1970, penetrated local consciousness.29
Representatives from King Resources began the hearing by observing
that Portland Harbor was already a major oil port, with extensive tank
farms lining its inner shores. The proposed supertanker pier, located in
the outer harbor, would have the latest pollution safeguards, and to ac
commodate aesthetic sensibilities the storage tanks and buildings would
be painted “soft green and white . . . to maintain the motif of an island
village.” A row of trees would screen the facility from the neighboring
town of Falmouth. Oil terminals, they asserted, were located at “some of
the most prominent and elegant beaches throughout the world.”30
This entreaty drew support from a scattered audience contingent in
terested in jobs. One group of Long Island residents presented a petition
supporting the project, and one local predicted that if Mainers remained
hostile to projects like this Portland’s youth would “have to move to
Philadelphia to find work in a refinery and come up here in summer.”
The King representatives closed on a note of frustration: “By now, we
have lost track of the public hearings . . . Our critics have had thirteen
months and I have heard nothing new. If there is homework to be done,
King Resources Company has done it. We would like to get on with our
job.”31
These complaints only stimulated the opposition. Since the hearing
was informal, the audience was allowed to pose questions directly from
the floor. CRAC lobbyist Harold Pachios asked if King intended to ex
pand the facility later to service even larger tankers. Receiving an indefi
nite reply, he continued his badgering, prompting an angry declaration
that King’s future plans were “none of your business.” Others joined in
the fray, touching off a lengthy exchange between the audience and the
commissioners, again reminiscent of the sometimes rough-and-tumble
proceedings at a Maine town meeting.32
It was clear that the commissioners felt a need to educate the public
on the purpose of the Site Location Law, but it was also clear that citi
zens were more interested in provoking heated argument than in learn
ing the finer points of hearing protocol. A shout from the audience that
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“a majority of Maine people don’t want the oil industry at all,” brought
Commissioner Delogu’s response that the question was not “subject to
popular vote” Another CRAC lawyer, Horace Hildreth, Jr., began baiting
King representatives with questions, irrelevant to the hearing, about
plans to construct a refinery. When this was ruled out of order, Hildreth
turned to the crowd: “I share [your] frustration . . . in trying to find out
what is King Resources [sic] really up to.” Rapping his gavel for order,
Koons responded sarcastically: “If you are quiet, you may .
have a
chance to find out.”33
As the afternoon wore on into the evening, erudite witnesses and
folk philosophers demonstrated varying abilities to express the feelings
of the audience, clearly weighted against King Resources. Concerns
raised about the project’s impact on residential property values, scenic
integrity, and the Casco Bay quality of life, earned more or less sustained
applause. The final effect of the project, as local legislator Mary Payson
put it, was akin to “dropping a somewhat overripe mackerel on the
doorsteps of Falmouth.” A representative of Keep Oil Out (KOO), one of
several emerging opposition groups, attempted to pass out oil soaked
postcards to the commissioners, who refused the gift.34
The hearing fully engaged the complex environmental constituency
emerging out of the oil port issue. Town officials from Portland’s sub
urbs focused on the lack of comprehensive planning for Casco Bay; fish
ers and boatbuilders expressed fears of more pollution; marine scientists
spoke of the economic potential of aquaculture; residents and recre
ationists worried about oil on their “white, white beaches.” The varied
concerns were perhaps best summarized by Ellis O’Brien, a long-time
resident who argued that Maine was at a crossroads: “Twenty years ago,
we would have had to jump like a fish at bait if somebody like King Re
sources [came to Maine] . . There was no alternative.” Maine was still
economically weak, but O’Brien and people like him had learned to em
brace this unique working landscape of small, traditional activities as a
place “where people can get out of the cities and go to live.” This new
pastoral sensitivity, as O’Brien concluded, was “inconsistent, to say the
least... with industrial development.” Defending the bay from “arrogant
industrialists,” witnesses politicized the rustic metaphors at the core of
Maine’s self-identity.35
The EIC voted against the Long Island project on grounds that it
posed too great a risk to recreational assets in the Casco Bay region.
While this decision was eventually reversed by the Maine Supreme
Court, the promoter went bankrupt in the interim and the project was
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abandoned. The controversy was thus decided by broader economic de
velopments, but politically it was a crucial moment for Maine’s emerg
ing grassroots constituency. The tanker port hearings crystallized the
major themes o f Maine’s new environmental consciousness: a new,
proud self-awareness o f Maine’s unique gift to the nation; a reminder of
past injustices at the hands o f outside interests; a sense o f pastoral abun
dance; a vision o f change that could be directed away from the mistakes
o f America’s industrial past. Such optimism was new to Maine, and it
energized people like Ellis O’Brien, spreading environmental concern
well beyond the issue o f an oil dock in Portland’s back yard. Maine’s tra
ditional town meeting dialogue had been transformed into an environ
mental revival meeting.36

Act 3. The Meaning of “Clean”
While the King Resources oil port was under review, a third proposal
was initiated in 1971 by yet another independent oil promoter. Fuel
Desulphurization, Inc. was created to help New York Consolidated Edi
son meet air quality standards for its metropolitan generating facilities.
When the promoter was blocked by local zoning officials and outraged
citizens in suburban New York, it turned to Maine, hoping to convert its
federal license into a project that would serve Boston area utilities’ simi
lar needs for low sulphur fuel. Renamed Maine Clean Fuels, Inc., the
company first approached South Portland, home to Maine’s largest con
centration o f existing oil facilities. But King Resources had already
spoiled the ground. When thousands of citizens signed petitions oppos
ing the idea, South Portland officials reversed their initial positive re
sponse. Promoters looked for a site as yet unencumbered by Maine’s
new environmental consciousness.37
Politically, Maine Clean Fuels’ second choice was even less astute.
The Penobscot Bay town o f Searsport was physically suitable and eco
nomically convenient, with an existing industrial harbor and a rail con
nection, but the supertankers would have to pass through a section of
the coast renowned for its tourism, in-shore fisheries, and yachting. The
midcoast harbored summer homes for some of the nation’s wealthiest
families. For just this reason Governor Curtis remained aloof from the
Maine Clean Fuels project, but promoters found sufficient local support
to push ahead.38
The opposition opened by organizing public meetings in the lower
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bay towns, and the region’s summer people began a letter-writing cam
paign that landed over 1,200 letters on the governor’s desk. Intending to
demonstrate that it, too, had substantial public support, Maine Clean
Fuels staged a meeting in Searsport, announcing ahead of time that only
local residents would be admitted. To enforce the “locals only” rule,
company officials posted uniformed guards at the entrance to the gym
nasium where the meeting was to be held. State police with riot gear
stood in reserve. While only about 200 citizens entered the building, an
other 800 milled around outside with placards and anti-oil literature.
When police and local officials decided to open the gym to everyone, the
moderator attempted to maintain decorum by redefining the meeting as
an informational session. Although the protesters eventually quieted
down, they had more than made their point; the event succeeded only in
portraying the company as a political novice with villainous overtones.39
By the time the EIC held Site Location Permit hearings in March
1971, eleven o f the fifteen towns around the lower Penobscot Bay had
voted against the project. Determined to avoid the town meeting-style
badgering they had experienced at Portland, the commissioners estab
lished strict rules to control testimony and witness qualifications. Audi
ence members were required to submit all questions in writing to the
EIC chair and applause was prohibited. Commission Chair Donaldson
Koons opened the hearings with a warning to the audience to avoid
emotional displays: All testimony was to be “factual and should address
itself to the issues.” Koons then read a letter from Governor Curtis who
cautioned that Maine people should put their faith in the Site Location
Law as a guarantee o f the state’s environmental integrity. Under these re
straints, the hearing was reduced to a string of “long, tedious and repeti
tious testimony”; the initial attendance of over 700 persons dwindled to
about 200 per day. Thus while the opening scenes of the drama had been
vociferous and demonstrative, the middle scenes were more earnest and
determined, dominated by a professional presentation style.40
During the hearings, Maine Clean Fuels stressed the safety of its so
phisticated pollution prevention equipment and the economic benefits
that would flow from the project. Company president David Scoll re
ferred to the 900 page application and promised even more data on air
and water quality, noise abatement, and protection of the marine envi
ronment. Shifting to the central legal issue in the application, whether
the project would adversely impact “existing uses,” Scoll provided a slide
show demonstrating that the Searsport area was already industrialized.
Scoll was followed by supporters representing pulp and paper, railroad,
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and trucking firms, the Searsport port authority, and local citizen
groups. A Maine State Labor Council official reiterated Maine’s tradi
tional concern for jobs: “Many argue that Maine’s scenic coastline will be
ruined by the refinery. But what does the presence of substandard hous
ing and tarpaper shacks do to enhance our coastline? How do people
who are poorly attired, undernourished and ravaged by ill health con
tribute to a scenic view?” Dividing Mainers into wealthy preservationists
and forward-thinking humanists was a common mode of political dis
course in the debate. Columnist Donald Hansen suggested that since
Penobscot Bay was simply a “private domain” for the privileged, it was
not worth preserving. To struggling mill town residents, “all this pious
talk about saving the Maine coast must seem so much baloney when you
can’t get to it.”41
There was substance to the argument that wealthy summer visitors
were active in the anti-oil campaign, but by 1971 the issue was far more
complex. In fact, opposition cut across Maine’s heterogeneous coastal
population, which included retirees and summer residents but also fish
ers, farmers, small business owners, and service workers. Local organiz
ers gathered 23,315 signatures on a petition against the project, easily
outnumbering those submitted by the oil proponents. Notwithstanding
the commissioners’ disclaimers about a popular plebiscite, this kind of
grassroots opposition weighed heavily in the debate.42
The most convincing arguments against the refinery came from or
dinary citizens whose claim to authority lay in their lifelong experience
on the coast. With an air of authenticity and ownership, Ossie Beal, pres
ident of the Maine Lobstermen’s Association, focused on the threats to
his own livelihood, demonstrating the stern self-interest and local un
derstanding that had become so convincing in statewide press coverage.
The refinery, he argued, threatened the lobster, clam, and marine worm
fisheries. “We who have spent our lives on the coast of Maine are familiar
with its strong tides, its heavy fog, its rocky shoals and severe storms,
[and] believe it to be one of the riskiest places to handle oil. For this rea
son we believe that spills are inevitable.” Beal’s local knowledge was
clearly more impressive than the promoters’ promises and statistical
projections.43
Adding to this testimony were several Maine coast retirees who drew
their authority from life experiences in more industrialized settings. El
liot Preston, a retired chemical engineer from Pittsburgh, drew a com
pelling contrast between the pastoral dream and the industrial night
mare: “It can only be the purest wishful thinking to believe that through
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som e m y sterio u s alchem y a refin ery an d oil p o rt can exist w ith o u t the
a tte n d a n t in d u s tria l, o b n o x io u s a tm o s p h e re th a t is an in te g ra l p a rt
[of] . . refin ery te c h n o lo g y " Likewise, a re tire d oil ta n k e r c ap tain ,
K arsten P endersen, testified th a t th e ap p ro ach es to P en o b sco t Bay w ere
“the m o st d an g ero u s along the East C oast."44
T he S earsp o rt h earings closed after eight days. M aine C lean Fuels
was allow ed to revise its plans fu rth er, b u t this was o f no avail. T he EIC
fo u n d th a t th e p ro m o te r h ad failed to p resen t ad eq u ate evidence o n
m ore th a n ten key p o in ts a n d d e n ie d th e ap p licatio n . M ost im p o rta n t,
the co m p an y h ad n o t d e m o n stra te d th a t an oil co m p lex co u ld “fit h a r
m o n io u sly in to the existing n a tu ra l e n v iro n m e n t" an d th e existing uses
o f th e P en o b sco t Bay region. B ridging the gap betw een locals an d “s u m 
m er people," p reserv atio n ists w on th e day.45
Public te stim o n y o n th e S earsp o rt oil p ro m o tio n rep resen ted th e
h ig h -w ater m a rk o f th e em erg in g e n v iro n m e n ta list political c u ltu re in
M aine. N ever again w ou ld th e issues seem so clear, an d never again
w ould they be so sim ply stated as th e y w ere d u rin g th o se eight days in
S earsport. P ro m o te rs re p e ate d the trie d an d tru e fo rm u la o f p ro sp e rity
an d progress b ased on in d u stria liz a tio n ; o p p o n e n ts stressed the p u b lic
claim s to th e coast as the fo n t o f M aine's p asto ral identity. W h ite beaches
an d w hite h ats aligned against black oil in a stra ig h t y e s-o r-n o p ro p o s i
tio n .

Act 4. Planning To Manage The Environmentalist Majority
A fter th e S earsp o rt h earin g s th e focus o f th e oil co n tro v ersy shifted
to p ro fessio n al p la n n in g . W ith th e sh ad o w o f “big oil" still h an g in g over
the coast, state reg u lato rs an d o rg an ized e n v iro n m e n ta lists d e te rm in e d
th a t co m p reh en siv e p la n n in g w o u ld be p referab le to decision m ak in g
th ro u g h th e c o n te n tio u s to w n m eetin g m odel. In stead o f w aitin g for
o u tsid e p ro m o te rs to in itiate specific pro p o sals, th ey fo rm ed a new p a r t
n e rsh ip to exam ine all sides o f th e issue a n d deliver a decision to th e leg
islature a n d th e p eo p le o f M aine. A lth o u g h statew ide p la n n in g failed to
resolve th e oil controversy, th is p ro fessio n al a p p ro a c h w o u ld have farreach in g im p lic a tio n s to r later e n v iro n m e n ta l issues.
T he new em p h asis o n co m p reh en siv e p la n n in g suggested th a t th e
d o o r w as still o p e n to oil d e v e lo p m e n t so m ew h ere o n th e M ain e coast.
W ith this u n d e rs ta n d in g , in 1971 EIC C h air K oons asked G o v e rn o r C u r
tis to create a task force to survey p o te n tia l sites. C u rtis was receptive;
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during the three long years of controversy he had conceded only that the
refinery should be located inland from the supertanker port, and that
the mid-Maine coast was inappropriate for oil port development. But as
long as the initiative lay with the oil promoters, Maine was open to an
endless round of hearings like those at Portland and Searsport. The mo
mentum against oil might become politically irreversible.46
On November 10,1971, Governor Curtis appointed twenty-two peo
ple to a new Task Force on Energy, Heavy Industry, and the Maine Coast.
Included were legislators, environmentalists, civic leaders, academics,
business owners, bankers, and a lobsterman. In his instructions, Curtis
pointed to the conflicting pressures from those who looked to the coast
“as a source of jobs in a time of high unemployment, recreation and
solitude in a time of urban unrest, marine resources in a time of worri
some food projections, energy during an energy shortage, tax dollars to
relieve unfair property taxes, and profit in a declining economy” The
Task Force was to minimize these conflicts by categorizing potential de
velopment sites, sparing the state the “costs and confusions of continual
heavy industrial speculation over the whole length of the Maine coast ”
Planning would provide the overarching political authority that had
eluded the administration during the public hearings. The Task Force
took this instruction literally, making no effort to assess public feeling
under the assumption that the report would be “more useful for not
having been tailored to meet subsequent public reaction.”47
During the Task Force's eight month review of the coast situation,
Curtis continued to prepare ground for public acceptance of this new
approach to the oil controversy. In what journalists called a “minor mir
acle,” CRAC agreed with unnamed industrialists that the state should
designate a single oil port for Maine. As the Task Force was completing
its final report, however, the oil tanker Tamano ran aground off Portland
Harbor, creating the most serious oil spill in Maine history While this
seemed prescient to oil opponents, the Task Force brushed off the event
and recommended Portland as Maine's single oil port. The compromise
was clear: Maine would preserve its coast by sacrificing Portland, already
the state's most industrialized harbor.48
Although calculated to bring opposite sides together, the recommen
dation succeeded only in dividing coastal residents; some opposed all
development, while others worried that without tanker ports Maine
would be isolated from the economic mainstream, like a “giant state
park ” John Cole, the outspoken editor of the Maine Times, accepted the
premise that oil development somewhere in Maine was “inevitable.”
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CRAC founder Horace Hildreth did not. These divisions became clear in
May 1972 when the Army Corps of Engineers held hearings in Portland
as part of a general survey of East Coast deep water ports. CWC, MAS,
and the Sierra Club opposed designating Portland as Maine's oil port;
NRCM and CRAC were conspicuously absent. The planning approach
to resolving the oil controversy failed, largely because it split the envi
ronmental movement, even as environmentalism was achieving its
broadest popular support in Maine. The consequences became apparent
when the bill implementing the Task Group report was introduced in
the 1973 legislature. Environmentalists categorically opposed to oil any
where on the coast united with industrialists categorically opposed to
state attempts to limit private oil initiatives and, together, they defeated
the bill.49
With central planning out of the picture after 1973, new oil promo
tions appeared, often with environmentalists on both sides of the issue.

Pittston Company map showing Eastport location in relation to existing terminals
in the northeast, “Prospectus for a 250,000 BPD Refinery and Marine Terminal at
Eastport, Maine,’1April 19, 1973.
Courtesy Special Collections Fogler Library, University of Maine.
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Hearings had become courtlike procedures. With strong backing from
the governor, NRCM, and former CRAC lobbyist Harold Pachios, the
independent Gibbs Oil Company proposed a pipeline carrying crude oil
from Portland Harbor to an inland refinery at Sanford. Harrison
Richardson, preparing a bid for the governor's seat, supported the Gibbs
proposal and expressed frustration with Maine's overly complicated en
vironmental regulations. The state's number one priority was jobs, he
claimed; as governor, he would work to soften Maine's anti-industry im
age. According to Pachios, opponents of industrial development were
typically “well off, and they don't want change." After lengthy site loca
tion hearings, years of effort, and millions of dollars in expenses, the
project was abandoned due to falling oil prices.50
With the statewide planning concept in shambles, the Maine coast
received one last oil proposal. Unlike the others, the Pittston Company
plan for a refinery at Eastport, near the Canadian border, seemed
doomed from the start. It called for construction of one of nation's
largest refineries at the end of a narrow, twisting coastal passage on a
fog-shrouded coast renowned for huge tides and swift currents. Head
Harbour Passage, moreover, lay in international waters, and the Cana
dian government steadfastly refused to jeopardize its local fisheries.
Moreover, Pittston's lack of corporate responsibility was already leg
endary. In 1972 a dam at a Pittston coal cleaning plant in Virginia rup
tured, burying the town of Buffalo Creek in mud and leaving 125 dead
and 4,000 homeless. A $205 million lawsuit hung over the company
while it negotiated for the oil refinery in Eastport. In 1975 the state gave
tentative approval to the project, but listed sixty-four conditions to be
met before final authorization; over the next two years Pittston did little
to meet the conditions. The company’s federal applications were equally
suspect. Its air quality modeling, for example, lacked local meteorologi
cal data. In the event of a refinery spill Pittston simply planned to ignite
the oil, an idea those familiar with the region's notoriously heavy
weather found appalling. And finally, because the site was near Roosevelt
International Park on Campobello Island, the EPA permit came with
stringent air emissions requirements, and the area was home to several
endangered marine species and nesting bald eagles.51
Yet local resistance played a decisive role in the long Pittston contro
versy, confirming a shift in values even in the hard-pressed communities
of eastern Maine. A location too remote to attract influential “summer
people," Eastport s fate seemed to hang on local support or opposition to
“big oil" and its promise of jobs and prosperity. Throughout the contro-
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Pittston Company artist’s rendering of the proposed oil refinery and marine termi
nal at Eastport. From The Pittston Company,“Prospectus for a 250,000 BPD Refin
ery and Marine Terminal at Eastport, Maine,” April 19, 1973.
Courtesy Special Collections Fogler Library, University o f Maine.

versy federal officials orchestrated the public hearings as dull renditions
of project history and permit processes, and locals were given the im
pression that the decision was in the hands of “the bureaucrats, not the
people.” Despite this, and a 20 percent local unemployment rate, local
opponents continued to turn out for state and federal hearings, becom
ing even more vocal and more strident in their anticorporate overtones
as the controversy dragged on. At a 1975 meeting before state officials,
nearly a third of the 150 who attended rose to speak and all but a few op
posed the project.52
Given the unending round of permit hearings and the dogged resist
ance in Eastport, the issue faded from public view when oil prices stabi
lized in the late 1970s. With the defeat of King Resources, Maine Clean
Fuels, and now Pittston, it appeared that the Maine coast was free of im
pending threat. There was, as journalist Richard Saltonstall pointed out,
always the possibility that “sooner or later a big league corporation
would present a concrete plan . . . supported by reams of data to answer
every conceivable question,” and the quandary of underdevelopment
would drive home the logic of oil port development. But the victory over
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Schematic of Pittston Company’s proposed oil refinery and terminal at Eastport.
“Prospectus for a 250,000 BPD Refinery and Marine Terminal at Eastport, Maine,"
April 19, 1973. Courtesy Special Collections Fogler Library, University of Maine.

“big oil was part of a nationwide shift in thinking about the costs and
benefits of energy development. Controversies like the offshore oil and
gas leases on the Atlantic and Pacific coasts, the TVA’s Tellico Dam on
the Little Tennessee, the Seabrook nuclear energy plant in New Hamp
shire, the Kaiparowitz coal fired generating plant in Utah, and the oilshale proposals in Colorado correlated with Maine’s shift in thinking
about growth, energy, and quality of life.53

Conclusion
Reflecting on the events of the early 1970s, editor John Cole mused
about the appearance of a “populist, top-to-bottom, rich-to-poor, rightto-left, universal constituency’’ raised to defend Maine’s pastoral land
scape: “It’s as if this corner of America, parked for two centuries in a ge
ographic and economic backwater, has been banked all these years just
so it could be here when Americans decided for the first time since the
Industrial Revolution that there may be a better way.” By popularizing
pastoralism as an alternative to industrial growth, the oil controversy
served as midwife to a grassroots environmental movement. Hence
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forth, nature would be given due consideration in all manner of devel
opment proposals.54
In the early years of this debate Robert Monks had raised a question
that few intelligent politicians would have dared to ask publicly: if in
deed Maine succeeded in holding industry at bay, must it then do every
thing in its power, “through social, economic and political initiatives, to
keep people where historical accident put them a hundred years ago?”
Wilderness advocates in the west might have pondered Monks's ques
tion seriously, but in Maine the integrity of the pastoral landscape still
signified a people imbedded comfortably in a natural world, the folk be
ing as important an ingredient in the Downeast landscape as nature.
Thus as the curtain rang down on “big oil,” the Maine Times once again
took up the question of jobs, cognizant that some had defended Pittston
only because their communities had no better economic options. Editor
Peter Cox proposed a new “marine trades center” at a closed cannery
complex in Eastport and new light industrial uses for Eastport's deep
water wharf. Others counseled only further patience. “If people hung
on ... the area could prosper under controlled development of its recre
ational assets, even as a summer colony based on arts and crafts
or
new kind of national park,” journalist Richard Saltonstall suggested.
Once again Maine seemed to have time to craft a vision for its unique
blend of natural and scenic resources, time to gain perspective on Amer
ica's headlong dash to techno-utopia. Cox noted in governing circles a
lingering feeling that “Maine has nothing to offer itself, and so must
court people from outside to come in and take advantage of us.” But
most Mainers, he thought, seemed ready to abandon the “big bang solu
tion” to economic problems. Maine's best chance was as it always had
been: a slow accumulation of diversified small industries attracted to the
state's varied natural resources and to its hard-working, enterprising
people. “Organic” growth— making bricks from local clays, raising mus
sels and oysters, harvesting seaweed for fertilizer, manufacturing wind
mills, cabinets, and other secondary products from local woods, print
ing, and perhaps an agricultural resurgence geared to greater regional
self-sufficiency—spelled the future for the Maine coast. During the pro
tracted fight, popular thinking about Maine's growth strategies had
come full circle: small industries and a rural folk eking out an independ
ent living once again provided the image, if not the reality of life on the
coast.55
Maine had gained much from the performances of the “theater of
oil” By the mid-1970s the state had passed landmark legislation that
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lodged veto power over heavy industry in the state planning apparatus.
Perhaps more important, the battle for the coast drew national attention
to Maine’s distinction as a postindustrial sanctuary for all of the North
east, and in the process advanced the environmental message immeasur
ably Energized by public hearings and by multiple threats to a familiar
way of life, statewide organizations and grassroots groups gained confi
dence, experience, and an audience well beyond their initial upper-class
base. This company of vacationers, hunters, anglers, hikers, backpackers,
women’s club and civic group members, PTA leaders, journalists, scien
tists, politicians, and the “many Mainers who live in urban areas but who
have camps and cottages on the coast, [or] on the lakes” remained the
heart and soul of Maine environmentalism. The themes articulated in
the "theater of oil”—the limits of technology, the pressures of develop
ment, the specter of 70 million urban and suburban dwellers within a
day’s drive of Maine—committed Maine’s environmentalist majority to
a new cultural construction of their state.56
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